It has been noted that the proposal contained in the volume by Thaler and Sunstein (Nudge, London: Penguin, 2008) and in subsequent articles, also identified as libertarian paternalism, constitutes a positive innovation in the field of public policy, but it is accompanied by negative aspects that must be considered and overcome. In particular, it has been pointed out that nudges can be divided into at least two categories on the basis of the libertarian criterion of autonomy and conscious choice of the citizen: System 2 or deliberation-promoting nudges that promote the capacity for conscious decision-making and help to avoid errors and bias; System 1 nudges or automaticity-promoting nudges that, on the contrary, build on some automatic propensities of the so-called S1 to push the citizen to make choices for their supposed well-being, as decided by the policymaker in charge. As I pointed out in the beginning of this book, the terminological reference to System 1 and System 2 has a didactic reason and a metaphorical function and does not entail adherence to the theory of mental dualism, for which there is no empirical or theoretical justification. We have also seen that the concept of nudging proposed by T&S presupposes the acceptance of the descriptive and normative foundations of behavioral economics and Kahneman & Teversky’s Heuristics and Biases program. In this regard, some weaknesses have been highlighted from an empirical and descriptive point of view concerning the main assumptions of behavioral economics (such as prospect theory) and it has been noted that its rules of formal rationality are valid only in situations of risk and not in those that represent a large part of our daily and public life, characterized by uncertainty, unpredictability, ambiguity and complexity.
In general, nudges generate small behavioral changes that do not remain stable over time, but can have a cumulative effect of fair proportions. In any case, nudging does not exhaust the role of behavioral science in policy making. The Behavioral Insights concept was introduced to highlight how behavioral sciences can be a useful tool for choosing upstream the most effective policy approach to achieve the result desired by the policymaker. Some of these can take the form of nudges, possibly deliberation-promoting nudges, such as BRANs and Boosts. In other cases, it will be more effective to adopt other solutions such as coercive measures, including sanctions and limitation of personal freedom (as in the case of the fight against organized crime) or incentive regulations at the economic level (as in the policy of donations) or remain at the simple level of traditional public communication. In many cases, the policymaker’s result is achieved through a mix of behavioral, informational, economic incentive and enforcing measures. With regard to this mix, one can also make an assessment of the paternalistic dimension of the respective interventions.
The increasing paternalistic scale of government interventions consists in: 1) information; 2) choice architectures (Nudges, BRANs, Boosts); 3) incentives; 4) choice limitations; and 5) choice coercion and nullification. Behavioral interventions correspond primarily to the first two and to the third if we are to remain outside of the realm of economic incentives.
The behavioral approach to public policy has been criticized for the risk of creating a “psychocracy” to imprison the variety of human behavior in general formulas imposed from the top down by a technocracy of experts. However, this does not take into account the psychological nuances that often characterize human behavior in relation to different cultural and situational contexts. There is a need for a human-centered behavioral design of public policy that is better able to capture human needs and build on them to implement behavioral solutions. This human-centered design should also use qualitative research methods, such as participant observation, to shed light on what the citizen's real needs and preferences are, what their beliefs are, and how they interpret the situation. An emblematic example: instead of creating pedestrian routes based on the a priori schemes of architects, it might be preferable to rely on “desire lines”, i.e. those tracks that are found on the ground caused by the erosion produced by walking, which correspond to the spontaneous routes preferred by people. Some American universities, such as Berkeley, have followed this approach to pave pedestrian routes, which they have identified according to the habitual paths of students and faculty. Additionally, it is important to ensure the active participation of the population to identify the right BIs and to make them acceptable, as in the case of the anti-obesity program of the State of Victoria in Australia. In work done by the BIT in the State of Victoria in Australia, the same choice architecture interventions to avoid the consumption of fatty and caloric products were accepted when they were first agreed upon with the Citizens' Jury, while they were rejected by the public when they were proposed by the government without any public consultation.
How acceptable are behavioral interventions to the public? According to Sunstein and Reisch (2019) in general there seems to be, in major Western countries, greater support for nudging than for coercive measures. S2 nudges that rely on the reflective and conscious capacities of the subject are preferred over S1 nudges. Finally, this support dies out when the goal of the nudge is unclear and especially when it goes against the preferences of the citizen. The role of the government is critical in developing acceptance of behavioral interventions. First, these must be clearly included in the policy agenda so that the public can incorporate them into their expectations. Secondly, specific interventions must be based on some form of public consultation and active citizenship, such as "Citizens Forums," and not be top-down government initiatives.
The goal of this issue is to understand if behavioral analysis of public policies, BIs and behavioral public policies such as nudges are fundamental elements that contribute to the correct elaboration of public policy and as such, they should be integrated in the near future in the normal activity of policy making and not be just a special and exceptional case. To paraphrase Dick Thaler and his affirmation that behavioral economics would soon be defunct because all economics would become behavioral, it is conceivable that even public policy will no longer need any behavioral adjective, as it will become intrinsic to policy making. This is happening in many fields that are increasingly integrating the term behavioral into their toolbox.
Scope and Topics
Papers submitted to this special issue should address important research questions in the domain of behavioral paternalism. We particularly seek manuscripts that shed light on important ongoing debates, examine different kinds of behavioral paternalism, their normative ethical and rational justification, the embodied cognition dimension, the efficacy of nudging, the manipulative aspects of nudging, the behavioral audit and nudging in organization, the necessary role of behavioral insights in policy making, the comparative assesment of Behavioral Insights Team in the world or open up promising directions for future research. Papers can take different approaches to behavioral public policy and paternalism. We are open to submissions including quantitative and qualitative studies, and inductive and deductive approaches. While we anticipate most published papers to make empirical contributions, we will also consider conceptual papers that address important research questions and make significant theoretical contributions.
An illustrative, but not exhaustive list of topics that fall within the scope of this special issue is provided below:Goals vs. means behavioral paternalism
Normative references of nudging and boosting (adaptive bounded rationality vs. formal rationality; uncertainty vs. risk; Brunswick ecological constraints of experimental results)
Embodied Cognition and Behavioral Public Policy
Dark nudging, Social network and AI
System 1 Nudges vs. System 2 Nudges
Boost and empowering citizen’s autonomy
Social credit score as a dark nudging
Sludges and behavioral tools to neutralize it
BRAN-Bounded Rational Adaptive Nudging (smart heuristics to help citizens to choose public services)
Case studies of boosting versus nudging
Organizational behavioral audit and nudging
The long (or intermediate) run consequences on learning of paternalistic intervention
The length of the effect of nudging. Does the nudging effect wear off over time?
The counteracting reactions to paternalistic intervention. Do people move to other, perhaps worse, alternatives when some options are closed off or discouraged?
To what extent should harder forms of paternalism (e.g., drug prohibition) be replaced with lighter forms (e.g.nudging or sin taxes)?
Jeremy Bentham and the utilitarian philosophies on cognitive biases and paternalism.
Do ordinary people want to be nudged/paternalized by the state?
Generalized boosting versus specific boosting. (For example, improving financial decision making skills in general or making specific financial decisions easier. Relative roles?)
The impact on autonomy of paternalism.
Issue Editors
Mario J. Rizzo, New York University, USA
email: Mario.rizzo@nyu.edu (this opens in a new tab)
Riccardo Viale, University of Milano-Bicocca, Italy, and Herbert Simon Society
email: Riccardo.viale@herbertsimonsociety.org (this opens in a new tab)
Submission Process
Papers submitted to the special issue will follow the standard peer review procedure for Mind & Society (https://link.springer.com/journal/11299/submission-guidelines (this opens in a new tab)).
All papers must be submitted by 30 September 2024. Please select the correct special issue when submitting your paper to the journal at https://www2.cloud.editorialmanager.com/miso/default2.aspx (this opens in a new tab)
If you have questions about this special issue, you may contact the issue editors at Mario.rizzo@nyu.edu (this opens in a new tab) or Riccardo.viale@herbertsimonsociety.org
